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This paper considers non-cooperative two-person zero-sum undiscounted 
stochastic games with finite state and action spaces. It is assumed that 
one player governs the transition rules. We give a linear programming al-
gorithm and show, that an optimal solution to this program corresponds to 
the value of the game and to optimal stationary strategies for both players. 
Moreover, this linear programming formulation results in an existence proof 
of the value and of optimal stationary strategies for both players. 
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1. Introduction and preliminaries 
This paper considers non-cooperative two-person zero-sum stochastic 
games with finite state and action spaces, where the transition proba-
bilities are governed by one player. 
More formally, we consider games r = <S,{A (k),nE {1,2}},kE S,r,P>, 
n 
where S = {1, ... ,N} is called the state space: A (k) = {1, ... ,m (k)} 
n n 
is the set of pure actions for player n in state k; r : T ➔ IR is a 
real-valued function with T = {(k,i,j); k ES, i EA 1(h), jEA2 (k)} and 
r is cal led the payoff function; P = {p(t I k, i ,j); .Q, ES, (k, i ,j) ET} 
prescribes the transition rules, i.e. p(t I k, i ,j) 2:: 0 and 
N 
E p(t I k,i,j) = 1, so p(t I k,i,j) denotes the chance that the system 
.Q,=1 
will move to state .Q,, if in state k player 1 chooses pure action 
i E A1 (h) and player 2 pure action j E A2(k). 
Throughout this paper we wi 11 assume that p(t I k, i ,j) does not 
depend on i, i.e. player 2 governs the transition rules. In consequence 
we wi 11 suppress the subscript i in p(t I k, i ,j), e.g. 
P = {p(t I k,j); (t,k) Es x s, j E A2(k)}. 
The course of the play proceeds as usually in stochastic games. 
We will examine the undiscounted version of such stochastic games and 
the 1 imit expected average payoff criterium will be used. 
The notions of behavioral strategy, stationary strategy, limit expected 
average payoff, value und (e-) optimal strategies will be adopted in 
the usual way. 
The proof of the following lemma can be found in STERN [5], 
BEWLEY and KOHLBERG [1] and PARTHASARATHY & RAGHAVAN [4]. 
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Lemma 1. 1. A two-person zero-sum undiscounted stochastic game with 
finite state and action space, where the transition probabilities 
depend on one player only, has a value and both player posses optimal 
stationary strategies. 
A stationary strategy for player n will be denoted as TT , where . n 
TT = ( TT n ( 1 ) , ... , TT n ( N) ) and TT ( k) = ( TT (k 1 ) , ... , TT ( k , m ( k) ) ) w i th 
n n n ' n n 
mn (k) 
TT (k,i) 2: 0 and z:; TT (k,i) = 1. 
n i =1 n 
The set of behavioral (history dependent) strategies for player n will 
H be denoted as IT • 
n 
IT will denote the set of stationary strategies for player n. 
n 
If nn is such that for each kES there exist a ikEAn(k) with nn(k,ik)=l, 
then TT is called a pure stationary strategy and such a strategy will be 
n 
notated as TIP. Let ITP be the finite set of pure stationary strategies n n 
for player n. 
For a stationary strategy n2 of player 2, we denote by P(n 2) the 
N x N - matrix of transition probabilities, 
m2 (k) 
eq ua l s z:; p ( £ I k , j ) . TT 2 ( k , j ) . 
j=l 
Q(n 2 ) will denote the Cesaro-1 imit 




For a pair of stationary strategies (n 1 ,n2) the 1 imit expected 
average payoff will be notated as V(n 1 ,n2) = (V 1 (n 1 ,n 2), ... ,VN(n 1,n 2)), 
where Vk(n 1 ,n2) corresponds to the game starting in state k. 
It is known, that V(n 1 ,n 2) = Q(n 2).r(n 1 ,n 2), where r(n 1,n 2) is a 
N-vector with ask-th component: 
m1 (k) m2 (k) 
I I n 1 (k,i).n2 (k,j).r(k,i,j). 
i =1 j=l 
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The value of the game will be denoted as V(r) = (V 1 (r), ... ,VN(r)). 
The fol lowing lemma, which looks obviously, but needs a precise 
argument, can be found in VRIEZE [6]. 
Lemma 1. 2. For a stationary strategy TT 1 ( TT 2) of player 1 (2) it holds: 
mi nH V(TT 1 ,TT 2) = min V(TT 1 ,TT 2). ( max V(TT1 ,TT 2) = max V(TT~,TT 2)). 
TTP EITP H TTP Eilp TT 2El12 2 2 TTlEill 1 1 
In [2], RAGHAVAN and FILAR gave an algorithm for solving undis-
counted stochastic games, where one player controls the transition 
rules; solving means finding the value and optimal stationary strategies 
for the both players. Their algorithm is finite in the sense that it 
needs a finite number of basic computations. 
The procedure of FILAR and RAGHAVAN consists of four steps: 
In the first step for each (TT~,TTi) E rr~x rri the payoff V(TT~,TTi) is 
computed. In the second step for each state kE Sa matrix game is 
constructed from the numbers Vk(TT~,TTi). It turns out that the value 
of this matrix game equals Vk(r) and that an optimal stationary 
strategy for player 1 can be constructed by means of optimal actions 
for these matrix games. In the third step the game is reduced with 
respect to player 2, i.e. for each state pure actions of player 2 are 
deleted as long as this does not influence the value of the game. 
In the fourth step from the remaining game an optimal stationary 
strategy for player 2 is constructed by means of solving a LP-problem. 
In section 2 we will present an alternative algorithm for solving 
undiscounted stochastic games in which one player controls the 
transition law. Our algorithm solves the whole problem in one blow, 
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by means of a LP-formulation of the problem. This LP-problem is of 
N N 
size (2N+ E m1(k)) by (N+2 E m2 (k)). 
k=l k=l 
2. The algorithm 
We will first state the algorithm, next show that this linear 
programming problem has a solution and then prove that this solution 
corresponds to a solution of the stochastic game. 
Consider the following linear programming problem in the variables 
(g 1, ... ,gN),(v1, ... ,vN), xi(k), i1cA 1 (k), k1cS: 
N 
max E gk' subject to: 
k=l 
N 
( i) gk - E p ( R- j k, j) g ,Q, :S O, k E S, j E A2 ( k) 
,Q,= 1 
m1 (k) N 
(ii) gk+vk-.E xi(k).r(k,i,j)- E p(tjk,j).v,Q,:S 0, k1cS, j1cA2 (k) 
1=1 ,Q,=1 
m1 (k) 
(iii) E x.(k) = 1, k1cS 
• 1 I I= 
x.(k)~0, 
I 
k 1c S, i 1c Al ( k) . 
The dual 1 inear programming in the variables (w 1, ... ,wN) ,yj (k) ,zj (k), 
kE S, j E A2(k), is: 
N 
min E wk, subject to: 
k=l 
N m2(k) m2(t) 
(j) E L (t\i-p(R, I k,j) )y. (k) + L z. (t) = 1 ' ,Q, E S 
k=l j=l J j=l J 
N m2 (k) 
{jj) E E (okt-p(t I k,j))z.(k) = 0, ,Q, ES 
k=l j=l J 
m2 (k) 
i E Al (k) {jjj) - E zj(k).r(k,i,j)+wk ~ 0, k E s' 
j=l 
(jjjj) y. (k), z. (k) :2: 0, k ES, j E Al (k) 
J J 
(c\t = 1 if k = t and okt = 0 if k -:/: t). 
Lemma 2. 1. Both linear programming problems are feasible and have 
bounded solutions. 
Proof. Consider the primal problem. Note that g.Q,= min r(k,i,j), 
(k,i,j)ET 
x.(k) = 0, i > 1, obeys 
I 
the conditions (i) to (ii ii), so the primal problem is feasible. 
Now let (g,v,x. (k)) be a feasable solution. Let the stationary 
I 
strategy ·rr 1 for player 1 be such that TT 1 (k,i) = xi(k) and let TTiEIIi 
be arbitrary. 
Then from (i) and (ii) we get (in vector notation): 
(2. 1) 
(2. 2) 
From (2. 1) we get g ~ Q(TTi) .g and using this result, after multi-
plying (2.2) from the left by Q(TTi) yields: 
(2.3) 
5 
Now (2.3) shows that g is bounded from above (e.g. by max r(k, i ,j)). 
(k,i,j) 
From the duality theorem, it follows that also the dual problem 
is feasible and has a bounded solution. □ 
As we already did in the proof of lemma 2.1, we can associate 
with a set {xi(k); kES, iEA1(k)} a stationary strategy TT 1 (x) by 
defining TTl (x) (k, i) = xi (k). 








yields the assertion. 
~ g and now lemma 1.2 
□ 
For a feasable solution (w,y.(k) ,z.(k)) to the dual program we 
J J 
will define a number of quantities: 
m2 (k) 
uk = I z.(k), 
j=1 J 
(2.4) 
Sa = {k; k ES and Uk = 0} (2.5) 
;j (k) = zj (k)/uk, k ES\ s 0 and j E A2 (k) (2.6) 
m2 (k) 
tk = I (y.(k) +z.(k)), kE Sandt= (t1' ... ,tN) (2.7) 
j=1 J J 
y.(k) = (y.(k)+z.(k))/tk' kES, jEA2 (k) (2.8) J J J 
(from condition (j): tk > 0 if uk = 0) 
* n2 and n2 , both stationary strategies for player 2, by 
; 2 (k,j) = yj (k), k ES, j E A2 (k) and (2.9) 
n;(k,j) = ;j(k) for kES\S 0 and n;(k,j) = yj(k) for kES 0. (2.10) 
Remark 2.3. Note, that from (j) and (jj) we also have 
N m2 (k) m2 (,e,) 
I _I (okQ,-p(£ I k,j))(y.(k)+z.(k)) + I z.(£) = 1, £Es, 
k= 1 J = 1 J J j = 1 J 
which is equivalent to: 
N 
t,Q,- I p(£jk,;2).tk+u,e,=1, 
k=1 
Q, E S, 
Let for a stationary strategy n2 , after suitable renumbering of 




0 p ( 7T2) TT 
P 1 ( 1r2) P 1 1 ( 1r2) T+ T T+ T+ 
Pnn(1r2) corresponds to the nth ergodic class of P(1r 2), whose set of 
states wi'll be notated as En(1r 2), nE {1, ... ,T}. 
PT+l T+l (1r 2) corresponds to the transient states of P(1r2) and this 
set of transient states will be notated as T(1r 2). 
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Remark 2 . 4 . I: ( t £ - I: ~ p ( £ I k,:; 2 )t k) = 0 , n E { 1 , ... , ';} . ( 2 . 1 3) 
£ E En(:; 2) k EE n ( 7T 2) 
This can be seen at once as I: p(£ I k,;'2) = 1 for kEEn(;'2). 
£EE/;2) 
Lemma 2 . 5. (a) u = u P ( 1r;) . 
* (b) The transient states for P(1r 2) are exactly the states s0 . 
Proof. (a) This follows immediately after inserting definitions (2.4) 
and (2.10) in (jj). 
N 
(b) Note first that summing up condition (j) over £EN yields I: uk = N. 
k=l 
From the theory of Markov chains it follows that if u = u P(1r2), with 
N 
I: uk = N, then u can be written as: 
k=l 
u = A1(q1:0: ... :0)+\z(O:qz:O: ... :O)+ ... +A *(0: ... :0:q *:O) 
* T T 
T 
with "n ~ 0, I: \ = 
n= 1 n 
* * P(1rz), nE {1, ... ,T}. 
N and q equals the invariant distribution of 
n 
It follows, that, if for kE S, 
k E En (1r;) and furthermore u£ > 
* uk > 0, then for some n E { 1 , •.. , T } , 
* 0 for all £E En(1r2). 
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So, if we want to show, that s0 a re exactly the transient states 
of P(TI;), it is enough to show, that there does not exist an ergodic 
class entirely within s0. Therefore, suppose for some 
nE {1, ... ,T*} En(TI;) cS 0 . Summing up (2.12) over 2E En(TI;) then, yields 
for the left hand side (remember remark 2.4): 
which leads to a contradiction, as the right hand side is strictly 
positive. This shows that the assumption En(TI;) c s0 was wrong by which 
the lemma is proved. D 
Corollary 2.6. u can be written as 
u=A 1(q 1:0: ... :0)+A2 (0:q 2 :0: ... :0)+ ... +A *(0: ... :0:q *:0), 
T T 
w-z'.th A > 0, n 
n 
T* 
* {1, ... ,T }, E A = N and q equals the invariant 
n=1 n n 
distribution of P ( TI *2) . nn 
Corollary 2.7. Let TI~EII~, then 
N m2(k) T* 
E E zJ.(k).r(k,TI~ ,j) = E An V(TI~,TI 2)(n). 
k=1 j=1 n=1 
(Here V(TI~,TI2) (n) equals the expected average payoff for the pair 
(TI~,TI;) with as starting state a state belonging to En(TI;) .) 
Corollary 2.7 can be checked by inserting the expression for u of 
corollary 2.6 in the left hand side and remembering 
From now on (q,v,x. (k)) and (w,y.(k) ,z.(k)) will correspond to a 
I J J 
dual pair of optimal solutions. 
Lemma 2.8. (a) wk = 0 for k E s0 . 
(b) 
Proof.(a) Follows at once from uk = 0, kE s0 and {jjj). 
(b) Follows at once from corollary 2.7 and lemma 1 .2. □ 
Proof. From P(TT;) .g ~ g, it follows that the equality sign holds for 
9 
components, belonging to the recurrent states of P(TT;), 
N 
This yields: if z. (k) > 0, then E p(£ I k ,j) g 2 = gk. 
J £=1 
i.e. to S\S 0 . 
(2. 14) 
From the complementary slackness property we get: 
N 
if y.(k) > 0, then E p(£ I k,j) 9£ = gk 
J £=1 
(2.15) 
* (2. 14) and (2.15) together with the definitions of TT 2 and TT 2 gives the 
lemma. □ 
Corollary 2.10. (a) For each nE {1, ... ,r*}, gk is constant for hE En(TT;). 
(b) For each nE {1, ... ,;}, gk is constant for kE En(i2 ). 
In the fol lowing g(n), for n E {1, ... ,T*} or n E {1, ... ,;}, wi 11 denote 
the value of g on En(TT;) or En(;2). 
~ * Lemma 2.11. For (n 1 ,n2)E{1, ... ,T}x{1, ... ,T} we have 
either E (;2 ) n E (TT*2 ) = E (TT;) 
n 1 n2 n2 
or E (;2) n E ( TT 2*) = {i'J • 
nl n2 
Proof. Let k EE (;;:'2 ) n E (-r/2 ) and let £EE (1r*2 ), then £ and k 
nl n2 n2 
* ~ ~ communicate for P(TT 2 ). But then, as y.(k) > 0 if z.(k) > 0 it follows J J 
that£ and k also communicate for P(;2 ), so £E En 1 (;2). □ 
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Let D = { n; En(;;2)::, E~('ff;) }, nE {1, ••. ,::;} n 
n 
T = En(;;2) n T(rr;) nE{1, .•. ,::;} n 
T = {~; T (;; 2) => E ~ ('ff;)} 
n 
For a finite set B, we mean by !Bl the number of elements of B. 
Lemma 2. 12. For n E { 1 , ... , ::;} we have: 
~ nE D n 
n 
Proof. Summing up (2.12) over ,Q, E En(;;2 ) and using remark 2.4 yields 
the assertion. 
Remark 2.13. (a) (2.12) for 9-E:TT gives 
* (b) (2.12) summing up over En('ff 2) for nET yields: 
Lemma 2 . 1 4 . max V ( 'ff f , 'ff;) ( n ) = g ( n ) , n E { 1 , . • . , T * } . 
rrP 
1 
Proof. From duality theorem and lemma 2.8 (a) and 
T* 
I: g = I: w,Q, = I: .\ max V(rrf ,'ff;) (n) 
,Q,E: s ,Q, 9-E S n=1 n 'ff~ 
(b) we get: 
= 
p * ~ max V ( 'ff l , 1r 2) ( n) . I: .\ + I: .\ 
rrp nE:D n nET n 
max V ( 'ff f , 1r; ) ( n ) 
p 
1 ~ 'ff 1 
Now it should be noted from lemma 1 .2 and lemma 2.2 that for 





Substituting inequality (2. 19) in (2.18) yields: 
N ~ T 
I g k 2':: I g (-;;) I ;\ + I g(n) ,;\ . (2.20) ~ n n k=l n=l nED nET ~ n 
If we insert in the right hand side of (2.20) the expressions for 
I ;\ , n E { 1 , ... , ;} and ;\ , n E T of 1 emma 2. 12 and of (2. 17) , then, 
nED~ n n 
n 
after suitable rearrangings of terms and using the expression (2.16), 
N 
it follows, that the right hand side of (2.20) exactly equals I gk. 
k=l 
* But, as ;\n > 0 for each nE {1, ... ,T} this means that in (2.19) the 
equality sign holds, which proves the lemma. □ 
Theorem 2. 15. The game has a value and both players posses optimal 
stationary strategies; g is the value of the game, TT 1 (x) is an 
optimal stationary strategy for player 1 and TT; is optimal for 
player 2. 
Proof. From lemma 2.14 max Vk(TT~,TT;) 
TTP 
* 1 
But,as by lemma 2.9 P(TT 2) .g = g, also 
gk, kET(TT;). 
So we have 
p *) max V(TT 1 ,TT 2 2':: g. 
TTP 
Using 1 emma ~ . 2 ( 2 . 2 1 ) gives: 
* maxH V(TT 1,TT 2) 2':: g 
TTldil 
for the transient states we 
(2.21) 
(2.22) 
(2.22) combining with lemma 2.2 shows the theorem. □ 
3. Some remarks 
Remark 3. 1. If in each state player 1 has only 1 action, then the game 
11 
12 
reduces to a minimizing Markov decision problem. In that case our 
algorithm reduces to the algorithm proposed by Hordijk and Kallenberg 
[3]. 
Parts of their proofs could be projected on our problem; in particular 
the fact, that s0 is exactly the set of transient states for P(n2) 
could be proven for both cases in an analogue way. 
* . The problem of proving the optimality of n2 1s essential different. 
* Namely fol lowing their 1 ine of argument, would mean showing that n2 
N 
is "optimal" against all TT~ such that TT~E X ak' where 
k=l 
ak = {ik; ik E A1 (k) and n 1 (x) (k, ik) > O}. Clearly this is not enough 
* for showing the optimality of n2 . 
Remark 3.2. If it is known in advance that for each n2Err 2 the transition 
probability matrix P(n 2) is such, that the s.et of all states form an 
ergodic class, then as well the algorithm as the proofs can be con-
siderably simplified. 
Namely the algorithm becomes: 
subject to: 
N 
max g (g is a number now) 
m2 (k) 
(i) 9+vk- E x.(k)r(k,i,j) 
i =1 I 
- E p(.Q, I k,j)v.Q, s; 
£=1 
m2 ( k) 
(ii) E x.(k) = 1 and 
I 
i =1 
(iii) x.(k):::: 0. 
I 
The dual of this 1 i near programming problem is: 
N 
min E wk' subject to: 
k=l 
N m2 (k) 
(j) E E z. ( k) = 
k=l j=l J 
N mz (k) 





(jjj) - z:: z.(k).r(k,i,j)+wk:::: 0, 
j=l J 
iEA,(k), kES 
(jjjj) z.(k):::: 0. 
J 
m2 (k) 
In this case the stationary strategy 1r2 with 1r2 (k,j) = z.(k) / Z:: z.(k) J . 1 J j= 
for each j and k is optimal for player 2, if the z.(k) 1 s belong to 
J 
an optimal solution of the dual program. 
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